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I 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD QF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in dismissing appellant's claim with 
prejudice on the basis that appellantfs claim for personal 
injuries was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because 
appellant had an opportunity to litigate the personal injury 
claim with the property damage claim in small claims court? 
The standard of review concerning conclusions of law grants 
the trial court "no deference, but reviews them for correctness." 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision to be reviewed was filed by the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 3rd day 
of June, 1994, case no. 930904041PI. The Appeal in this matter 
was filed on the 20th day of June, 1994. The Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3) (j) Utah 
Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
"a judgment otherwise final remains so despite the 
taking of an appeal unless what is called taking an 
appeal actually consists of a trial de 
novo." (Restatement 2d of Judgments, s.s. 13, as cited 
in D'Aston V. Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1992) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties are residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. An action was brought in the Small Claims Division of the 
Third Judicial Circuit Court, Sandy Department, State of Utah, 
for recovery of property damages on a slip and fall accident 
which occurred on Defendant/Appellees1 property on or around 
April 10, 1991. Hearing was had on May 6, 1992 and judgment was 
rendered in favor of the Defendant (see Addendum A-l). Plaintiff 
filed an appeal to the Third Circuit Court for a trial de novo, 
which was granted and scheduled for the 28th day of August, 1992 
at the hour of 2:00 p.m. before the Hon. Roger A. Livingston, 
Judge of Third Circuit Court, Sandy Department. Plaintiff, for 
reasons stated in the Statement of Facts, below, did not appear 
at the August 28th hearing. Defendant did appear in person and 
through counsel, and judgment was entered against the Plaintiff, 
with prejudice concerning the trial de novo on or around the 22nd 
day of February, 1993 (See Addendum A-2) . On or around the 30th 
of December, 1993, a Complaint was filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, for personal injury damages 
relating to the aforementioned accident, case no. 930904041PI. 
In an order dated the 3rd day of June, 1994, the Hon. John A. 
Rokich, Judge of the Third Judicial District, dismissed the case, 
again with prejudice, citing the doctrine of res judicata as the 
reason for dismissal (see Addendum A-3) . An appeal was filed 
with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on the 20th day of 
June, 1994 and is before the Court at this present time. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case stems from an accident that occurred on April 10, 
1991. Appellant was employed by Newspaper Agency Corporation 
("NAC") as a district manager. One of her responsibilities 
included ensuring home deliveries of the Deseret News, otherwise 
missed, were replaced and accounted for. 
On the evening of April 10, 1991, appellant was dispatched 
by NAC to appellees1 home to replace a wet newspaper. Appellant 
arrived at appellees1 home as a business invitee. Upon arriving 
at appellees1 home appellant noticed the sidewalks and driveway 
were icy as a result of a winter storm. 
Appellant walked to the front door and delivered the paper. 
As she was returning to her vehicle, appellant slipped on the icy 
walk and fell. As a result of her fall, appellant suffered 
personal injury to her hand and property damage to a diamond ring 
Appellant filed a small claims action against appellees for 
property damage arising out of the fall on appellees' property. A 
trial was held on May 6, 1992 with the small claims judge 
entering a judgment in appellees' favor (see Addendum p. A-l). 
Appellant appealed the decision to the Circuit Court on May 
13, 1992. A trial de novo was held on August 28, 1992. Appellant 
failed to appear because of a scheduling conflict that could not 
be resolved in time and because of some confusion in being able 
to determine the new address of opposing counsel for Defendants, 
who had recently moved, Plaintiff was not able to advise opposing 
counsel of a pending hearing in United States Bankruptcy Court 
which was being heard at approximately the same time and which 
precluded Plaintiff's being present at the Third Circuit Court 
hearing. In spite of the fact that Plaintiff sent a friend of 
hers to request a continuance, and who did not plead the case on 
it's merits, the circuit court entered a judgment with prejudice 
against her, but treated the judgment like a default judgment in 
that it also ordered that Appellant could not refile (which would 
only be done in a default situation, since a refiling after a 
hearing on the merits would obviously result in a res judicata 
situation) until she had paid costs and fees of the opposing 
party, (see Addendum p. A-2) . 
On December 30, 1993 appellant filed a Complaint for 
personal injuries arising from the fall on April 10, 1991. 
Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss. After the parties submitted 
memoranda and a hearing by the court, the court dismissed 
appellant's claim with prejudice. In it's findings, the Court 
held that applicable law prohibited appellant from splitting her 
personal injury claim from her property damage claim and that the 
bringing again of the former claim was barred by res judicata 
(see Addendum p. A-3) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Trial Court erred in so ruling against Appellant in 
this matter because, while countenancing the first two 
requirements of the three requirement test for Res Judicata, as 
cited in Fitzgerald v. Corbett. 793 P.2d 356 (Utah 1990), towit: 
"In order for a claim to be barred by res judicata, the 
current claim and a prior claim must satisfy three 
requirements: 
(1) both cases must involve the same 
parties, their privies or assignees; (2) the claim 
that is asserted to be barred must have been 
presented or be such that it could have been 
presented in the first case . . ."(6359) 
it failed to take into account the third requirement, which 
states that 
"the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment 
on the merits."(ibid.) 
ARGUMENT 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S CLAIM WITH 
PREJUDICE ON THE BASIS THAT APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR PERSONAL 
INJURIES WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BECAUSE 
APPELLANT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE THE PERSONAL INJURY 
CLAIM WITH THE PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT? 
The nature of a judgment in Small Claims Court appears 
always to have been tempered by the following two paragraphs; 
first: 
"(1) Either party may appeal the judgment of the small 
claims department of the circuit . . . court to the 
circuit court of the county . . •" 
and 
"(2) The appeal to the circuit court is a trial de novo 
and shall be tried in accordance with the procedures of 
the small claims department, except a record of the 
trial shall be maintained." (Ut. Code Annot.
 f 78-6-
10(1), (2) 
The unique nature of the effect of a trial de novo on the 
general bar to rebringing an action under the doctrine of res 
judicata has rarely been addressed in a Utah Appeals Court since 
the days of Moss v. Taylorr 273 P 515 (1928) wherein the general 
principle under old law was articulated in this way: 
"When an appeal is taken to the district court from a 
judgment rendered in the [lower] court, such judgment 
ceases to be in any sense a final judgment. Unless the 
appeal is dismissed, a trial de novo must be had in the 
district court." 
After all is said and done, however, in the intervening period of 
nearly sixty seven years, the principle seems not to have changed 
appreciably. In more recent days, for example, Moaa is cited in 
Restatement 2d as support for the general principle that 
"the better view is that a judgment otherwise final 
remains so despite the taking of an appeal unless what 
is caled an appeal actually consists of a trial de 
novo."(Judgments, s.s. 13, p. 135) 
Utah Courts, in what little cases have made comment on this 
principle, have never waivered from it. In his dissent from the 
majority opinion in Salt Lake City v. Piapenburg, 571 P.2d 1299, 
Justice Maughn flatly states that 
"A trial de novo is not an appeal." (8 1315, emphasis 
added) 
In expanding on the issue of when res judicata attaches, the 
clearly controlling case for this set of facts is a fairly recent 
one, Kirk v, Div. Of Occ. & Pro. Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah 
App. 1991) which first quotes a guiding principle for judges who 
consider such matters, as found in 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law 
Treatise s.s. 21:3 (2d ed. 1983) which states 
"When an agency conducts a trial-type hearing, makes 
findings, and applies the law, the reasons for treating 
its decision as res judicata are the same as the 
reasons for applying res judicata to a decision of a 
court that has used the same procedure. But the 
formality may be diminished in any degree, and when it 
is sufficiently diminished, the administrative decision 
may not be res judicata. The starting point in drawing 
the line is the observation that res judicata applies 
when what the agency does resembles what a trial court 
does." 
Kirk, makes the key distinction, that in some cases, formality may 
be diminished when prior proceedings do not resemble true court 
proceedings in some important areas, and thus, when it is so 
diminished, a decision thereunder may well not be res judicata. 
That is clearly the case here. Like a justice court, in a small 
claims court no record of proceedings is made except for the 
terse order filled out at the end of the proceeding. This 
informality is one of the critical things that makes an appeal by 
trial de novo so necessary, so that the required formality of a 
record is present to accompany the proceedings in general. The 
lack of this in Kirk was fatal to the lower decision and resulted 
in reversal, for, as the Court said, 
"There were no written findings of fact, no written 
conclusions of law, and the hearing itself was not 
recorded . . . [g]iven the informal nature in which 
this hearing was conducted, we cannot conclude that it 
afforded Kirk the rights and procedural safeguards that 
must be present when an agency acts in a judicial 
capacity conducting a trial type hearing. For this 
reason, res judicata could not attach to the proceeding 
. . .".(0244) 
Clearly, the foregoing quote is strongly determinative in the 
present set of circumstances. In the case here, not only was the 
initial Small Claims hearing lacking in the necessities 
enunciated in Kirk that would have given rise to the use of res 
judicata at the District Court level, but for reasons that can 
only be guessed at, rather than a continuance being granted in 
the trial de novo at the circuit level, instead it was not held 
at all, and a prejudicial judgment (as if the case were decided 
meritoriously, which it clearly was not) entered against 
Plaintiff. This being the case, Plaintiff lacks still a 
meritorious determination of the issues, and therefore it was 
error for the District Court to apply res judicata in this 
particular case in the clear absence of any meritorious verdict; 
for again, and this cannot be stressed too much, it is obvious to 
any careful reader of the proceedings at the next level that, 
under the circumstances, no meritorious finding could possibly 
have been made about Plaintiff's claims, hence Plaintifffs right 
to such has been unquestionably been abrograted. 
CONCLUSION 
The cases cited are on point, determinative, and entirely 
controlling in the matter presently before the Court. Plaintiff 
was not only denied a meritorious determination in a court of 
record on her claims, but when she attempted to bring this matter 
to the attention of the court of general jurisdiction in this 
state, the doctrine of res judicata was misapplied by a judge of 
that Court. To do anything but send this case back to a lower 
level for that trial de novo would work a clear injustice to the 
Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court has no choice but to reverse 
and remand so that this claim can be adjudicated, one way or the 
other, meritoriously. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ Z . day of February, 1995. 
CERTIFICATION QF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I served a copy 
of the foregoing on Defendant at the following address, and in 
the manner below indicated: 
Brett G. Pearce, Attorney at Law U.S. Mail x 
Richard K. Spratley & Associates Express Mail 
4021 South 700 East, Suite 250 Hand Delivery 
Salt Lake City UT 84107 Telecopier 
t ^ 
DATED this 31 day of February 1995. 
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PQUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
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Street Address 
City, State, Zij 
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, Plaintiff ) 
) SMALL CtAIMS 
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Agent & Title — * ^ " • -
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Date of Trial _ 
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The Court Orders Judgment as follows: 
• For Plaintiff 
$ _ 
$ 
$ 
.Principal 
.Court Costs 
. Total Judgment, with interest at 12% per year until paid. 
This judgment is effective for 8 years. 
XF? u For Defendant 
i g No cause of Action 
^3\Dismissalwi-1 Prejudice (plaintiff may not refile case) 
D Dismissal without Prejudice (plaintiff may refile case) 
Dated. ^fifi.nSf 
Judge 
I • mailed NTT/delivered a copy of this judgment to Q^el 
Dated tfjfy? , 19^2= 
.Qi cm a+11 ro rff P l n i n 
iintiff ^Q^efendant 
ItffcJ— 
i i 
B r e t t G. P e a r c e [5220] 
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendants 
4021 South 700 East, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-7007 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
..OOOOO.. 
LYNN NIELSEN : 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
CIVIL NO. 920003815 
RONALD MORTENSEN and DEL RAE : 
MORTENSEN Judge Roger A. Livingston 
Defendants. 
Came on for trial in the above-captioned matter on Friday, August 
28, 1992 at 2:00 p.m. Defendants were represented by Brett G. Pearce 
of Richard K. Spratley & Associates. Plaintiff made no appearance 
either personally or through an attorney. A friend of plaintiff's 
appeared and requested a continuance. The Court was of the opinion 
that because plaintiff did not attend the scheduled trial either 
personally or through counsel, she failed to appear; therefore, no 
proper motion for continuance was before the Court. Also, even.after 
considering the matters upon which the motion for continuance was 
based, the Court was of the opinion that plaintiff failed to show the 
requisite due diligence. After having fully considered the matter and 
\ 
being fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: that plaintiff's 
A-2 
claims against defendants in the above-referenced case are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. If plaintiff files any motion, petition or 
takes any action to set this judgment and order aside, plaintiff must, 
as a condition precedent, pay all reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
incurred by defendants in defending against the claims brought in the 
instant case. 
DATED this ^\J\ day of October; l&p. 
~ BY THE.. COURT: 
•t 
5 ^ -
'< s-j '^ ~ \>- ?yy<&" 
i'Rptjer A. Livingsto.n^^^^^^^^ ^ 
tfhird Circuit fcowft 'Judge 
CERTIFICATE QF MAILINg 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Judgment and Order, postage prepaid, to Defendant Lynn 
Nielsen, P.O. Box 1944, Sandy, Utah 84091, this 7 day of October, 
1992. 
Brett G. Pearce [5220] 
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendants 
4021 South 700 East, Suite 420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-7007 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
..ooOoo.. 
LYNN NIELSEN, : 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
CIVIL NO. 930904041PI 
RONALD MORTENSEN and DELRAE : 
MORTENSEN, Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendants. 
Came on for hearing in the above-captioned matter, defendants' 
motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, on May 9, 1994 at 9:00 a.m. 
Plaintiff was represented by her attorney, Lynn C. Spafford. 
Defendants were represented by their attorney of record, Brett G. 
Pearce. Of particular concern to the Court at the instant hearing was 
whether plaintiff knew she had been injured in the April 10, 1991 slip 
and fall when she filed her April 13, 1992 Small Claims Action against 
defendants. 
After hearing sworn testimony of plaintiff and reviewing 
evidence proffered by defense counsel, the Court was persuaded that 
plaintiff knew of her alleged personal injuries long before the April 
13, 1992 Small Claims Action against defendants was filed. 
Additionally, after reviewing the memoranda and arguments submitted by 
both plaintiff's and defendants' counsel, the Court was of the opinion 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JM 0 3 1994 
that applicable law prohibited plaintiff from splitting her cause of 
action and that plaintiff's complaint in the instant case is barred by 
operation of the doctrine of res judicata. 
Therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's complaint against 
defendants in the instant case is'dismissed with prejudice, each party 
to bear their own costs. 
DATED this <j? day of r\ (JC+-~<^ , 1994. 
d District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE QF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this \^[ day oi\T\(h\ , 1994, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to, Earl S. 
Spafford, and Lynn C. Spafford, Attorneys for Plaintiff, SPAFFORD & 
SPAFFORD, 230 South 500 East, Suite 150, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
